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Abstract 
The decision in OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277 causes confusion to the rule in 
Wilkinson v Downton. A strong line of authorities indicates that the defendant must either 
have an actual intention to cause physical injury or be reckless as to the causing of such 
harm, the latter being determined by the likelihood of harm being caused by the defendant’s 
act. ‘Imputed intention’ does not form a separate category of mental state. There was also a 
missed opportunity to develop a ‘justifiability’ criterion, by which policy considerations can be 
taken into account to preclude an application of the tort. This criterion ought to be developed 
in a principled manner, in line with the existing jurisprudence concerning human rights and 
with the policy limitations as developed in the context of other torts. 
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A. Introduction 
According to Wright J in Wilkinson v Downton, 1  a cause of action arises when ‘[t]he 
defendant … wilfully [does] an act calculated to cause physical harm to the [claimant] … and 
has thereby in fact caused physical harm to [the claimant].’2 This tort was once thought to be 
of diminishing significance, particularly due to the expansion of the tort of negligence to 
cover primary victims who suffer nervous shock3 and the passing of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997.4 In the recent case of OPO v MLA,5 however, the potential relevance 
of the rule in Wilkinson v Downton resurfaced in a case where the claimant had a claim 
under neither the tort of negligence nor the 1997 Act. It is therefore relevant to revisit the 
question: what are the relevant ingredients of that tort? Courts have confirmed that ‘physical 
harm’, which must in fact have been caused to the claimant, includes psychiatric injury but 
not mere alarm or emotional distress.6 Three questions remain, however: what must the 
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[1897] 2 QB 57. 
2
ibid 58–59. 
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 See eg Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155. It is arguable that a ‘wilful’ act by the defendant could, to the same 
extent, count as a ‘negligent’ act for the purposes of a claim in the tort of negligence. 
4
s 7(3) provides a civil remedy where a defendant engages in conduct amounting to ‘harassment’ ‘on at least two 
occasions’ where it relates to a single person, even where the claimant suffers mere anxiety short of physical 
harm (s 3(2)). 
5
[2014] EWCA Civ 1277. 
6
 See eg Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727, 736; Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 
at [11]–[12]; Wainwright v Home Office [2002] QB 1334 (CA) at [80]; Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2007] QB 836 at [98]–
[99]. 
defendant’s conduct or ‘act’ consist of; what does it mean to say that that act was ‘wilfully 
done’; what constitutes an act which is ‘calculated to cause physical harm’? 
 
B. OPO v MLA: Facts and Decision 
OPO v MLA involved an application for an interim injunction to stop STL, a publisher, from 
publishing a semi-autobiographical book written by a talented young performing artist, MLA.7 
The book was to be a means by which MLA spoke out in an ‘artistic and insightful’ way of his 
past experiences of sexual abuse at school and consequential episodes of severe mental 
illness and self-harming, and how he coped with the trauma through his art.8 It ‘contains an 
important message of encouragement to those who have suffered similar abuse to speak 
about their past.’9 OPO, MLA’s 11-year-old son born of his first marriage, now dissolved, 
brought proceedings by his litigation friend against MLA and STL to prevent the publication 
of MLA’s book. OPO, who lives with MLA’s former wife in another country, ‘Ruritania’, suffers 
from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, Asperger’s, Dysgraphia, and Dyspraxia.10 Expert 
evidence was adduced to show that OPO would be adversely affected if he read the book: it 
‘would be likely to exert a catastrophic effect on OPO’s self-esteem and to cause him 
enduring psychological harm’; ‘he could self-harm’; ‘[h]e might attempt to act out some of the 
descriptions in the Work’; ‘he [would] be unable to cope … and become greatly disturbed.’11 
 
OPO’s Wilkinson v Downton claim12 was based on a number of alleged facts. First, the book 
was dedicated to OPO.13 Secondly, a number of passages in the book were directed to 
OPO, for example, a letter addressed to OPO which referred to him by his true name.14 
Thirdly, through an exchange of emails in 2009 between MLA and OPO’s mother, as well as 
a term of their divorce order (‘Recital K’), MLA had recognised that OPO should not be 
exposed to details of MLA’s past until he attained an appropriate age, and that he would use 
his best endeavours to protect OPO from any such detriment-causing information. 15 
Fourthly, OPO was ‘computer savvy’, and although the book was intended for an adult 
market, he would seek to obtain information about the book from the internet.16 
 
At first instance Bean J rejected OPO’s claims.17  In relation to the rule in Wilkinson v 
Downton, he held that it did not extend beyond false reports.18 He reasoned that the modern 
statutory law of harassment would have been unnecessary if it was a legal wrong for anyone 
to do any deliberate act which was likely to cause psychiatric injury. In particular, he declined 
to open the floodgates, which would potentially make MLA liable for the psychiatric injury of 
any vulnerable readers of the book. 
 
In the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ (with whom Jackson and McFarlane LJJ, in their brief 
judgments, agreed) granted the interim injunction on the basis that OPO had sufficiently 
favourable prospects at trial of successfully establishing his claim under the rule in Wilkinson 
v Downton. It was held that the view likely to be taken at trial was that the tort would extend 
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ibid at [35]. 
beyond false words and threats.19 There must nevertheless be a lack of justification for the 
defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis the particular claimant; and in the circumstances of the case 
MLA lacked justification to publish the book.20  It was also held that intention could be 
imputed in the absence of actual intention or recklessness as to the causing of harm.21 Such 
intention was imputed to MLA taking into account the fact that the book was dedicated to 
OPO, that some parts of the book were directed to him, and that MLA had through the 2009 
emails and Recital K accepted that he should prevent OPO from suffering harm.22 
 
C. Conduct Required: The ‘Act’ 
In relation to the conduct required to engage the rule in Wilkinson v Downton, the Court of 
Appeal was correct to hold that it extends beyond false words and threats, both as a matter 
of principle and authority. Indeed, it has never been suggested that the tort is so limited. So, 
for instance, in Wilkinson v Downton where the defendant told the claimant as a practical 
joke that her husband had been injured, Wright J did not find the defendant liable based on 
the nature of his conduct itself, but on the fact that the act was ‘calculated to cause physical 
harm’.23 Indeed, the utterance of false words may not even be a prima facie ‘wrongful’ act;24 
and once this point is conceded, it follows that the tort can be engaged based on any 
conduct by the defendant, whether inherently wrongful or otherwise. Thus, Hale LJ observed 
in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust that digging a pit would suffice too25 – a point adopted 
by Arden LJ in OPO v MLA.26 Instead, the distinctive feature of the rule in Wilkinson v 
Downton is the indirectness of the physical harm inflicted,27 and any conduct may suffice for 
this purpose. 
 
D. Intention to Act: ‘Wilfully Done’ 
It is also not disputed that the defendant must have had an actual intention to act. The 
original formulation of the tort which requires that the defendant ‘wilfully … [does] an act’28 
has been read to mean that he must have deliberately engaged29 in the conduct complained 
of, objectively so determined. For example, it would not (and it has never been argued to) be 
sufficient for the defendant to have uttered false words or threats ‘accidentally’; such cases 
would fall to be considered under the tort of negligence. This issue did not arise in OPO v 
MLA: the planned publication of MLA’s book was a deliberate, intentional act. 
 
E. Intention to Harm: Acts ‘Calculated to Cause Physical Harm’ 
The requisite mental element required in relation to the consequences of the act is, however, 
much less clear-cut. What does it mean to say that the defendant’s act was ‘calculated’ to 
cause harm? The answer, gleaned from a strong and consistent line of authorities, is that the 
defendant must have either had an actual intention to cause the harm which in fact 
materialised, or must have been reckless as to whether the harm would be caused. 
 
The clearest case where actual intention was demonstrated is Janvier v Sweeney,30 where 
the defendant, pretending to be employed by Scotland Yard, misrepresented to the claimant 
that the military authorities wanted her for corresponding with a German spy, in an attempt to 
persuade her to hand over letters belonging to her employer. Those representations were 
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clearly threats made with ‘an intention to terrify’ the claimant,31 thus making the defendant 
liable under the rule in Wilkinson v Downton for the physical injury suffered by the claimant. 
As Stuart-Smith LJ put it in Powell v Boldaz, in such a case the defendant’s statement is 
uttered ‘with the intention that it should be believed and with the intention of causing injury.’32 
 
In relation to recklessness, this element has found four different judicial expressions. The 
first is in terms of the likelihood of causing harm: the harm must be ‘sufficiently likely to 
result’.33 The second is in terms of the foreseeability of the harm caused: the claimant must 
show that ‘the damage was the … foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s intentional 
act.’34 The third is stated from the defendant’s point of view: he may not be permitted to ‘say 
that more harm was done than was anticipated’35 or that ‘he did not “mean” [the act] to do 
so.’36 The fourth is in terms of imputed intention: where the act is so plainly calculated to 
harm the claimant, ‘an intention to produce it [is] imputed to the defendant.’37 
 
The first three expressions are essentially different ways of putting the same thing. The 
factual likelihood that harm will result from the defendant’s act directly correlates to what the 
legally construed ‘reasonable man’ foresees as the consequences of such an act, and this 
determines whether or not a court concludes in a particular case that the defendant is liable 
for the harm caused despite his claiming not to have intended to cause such harm. 
 
The fourth expression – imputed intention – is, however, potentially ambiguous, and a 
careful investigation of its true meaning is imperative. In the context of the rule in Wilkinson v 
Downton, ‘imputing intention’ is merely another way of expressing the fact that the defendant 
was reckless, in view of the fact that his act was likely to (and, to the same extent, would 
foreseeably) cause harm. This was certainly the way in which Wright J used the expression 
in Wilkinson v Downton,38 and this was subsequently echoed by the Court of Appeal in 
Powell v Boldaz,39 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust40 and Wainwright v Home Office.41 
Furthermore, these authorities also confine the language of imputation to the context of 
recklessness, and for good reason. In contrast to liability based on actual intention, where 
the focus is on the defendant’s deliberate will in adopting the plan to harm the claimant, 
recklessness concerns the attribution of (fictional) intention to the defendant on the basis 
that the defendant was wrong to have accepted the (highly likely) harm as a side effect of 
what the defendant did intend through his acts.42 ‘Imputation’ describes this attribution of 
fictional intention where the likelihood of harm criterion is satisfied. 
 
Unfortunately, ‘imputation’ is liable to mislead in two different ways. First, it may be taken to 
underpin any finding of the defendant’s state of mind, whether of actual intention or 
recklessness. This appears to be the analysis adopted by Field J in C v D.43 He held that 
‘there are three bases of imputation.’ The first is where the defendant’s acts are ‘calculated 
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to cause psychiatric harm and are done with the knowledge that they are likely to cause 
such harm’; the second is that ‘psychiatric injury is sufficiently likely to result from the 
[defendant’s] conduct’; the third is where ‘the defendant was reckless as to whether he 
caused psychiatric harm.’44 On the facts before him, where the claimant suffered psychiatric 
harm from the defendant head teacher’s acts of pulling down his trousers and underpants 
and staring at his genitals, the defendant was held not to be liable under the first two bases 
of imputation, but liability was found on the third.45The judge’s reasoning is both inaccurate 
by way of authority and unhelpful in principle. On point of authority, a defendant could not be 
held to be reckless apart from a consideration of the likelihood of his act causing the harm. 
As Hale LJ observed in the Court of Appeal in Wong, ‘[the defendant] is taken to have meant 
[his act] to [cause harm] by the combination of the likelihood of such harm being suffered as 
the result of his behaviour and his deliberately engaging in that behaviour.’46On point of 
principle, the language of imputation adds nothing to our understanding of the tort if it does 
not help us to distinguish recklessness from actual intention on the one hand, and any lesser 
state of mind which does not engage the tort on the other hand.47 
 
Secondly, ‘imputation’ may be taken to be an alternative ground for finding liability, distinct 
from actual intention and recklessness. This analysis is reflected in the judgment in OPO v 
MLA. Counsel for MLA had submitted that nothing less than subjective recklessness would 
do for the purposes of the rule in Wilkinson v Downton.48 This submission was based on an 
obiter distinction Buxton LJ drew in Wainwright 49  between a defendant acting ‘with the 
knowledge that [his acts] are likely to cause [harm]’ (so-called subjective recklessness) and 
one acting without such knowledge although the harm was so likely to occur that he could be 
held to be objectively reckless. In rejecting this submission, Arden LJ held that ‘even if MLA 
does not intend to cause harm and is not reckless, the necessary intent can be imputed to 
him’.50 
 
Taking the rejection of counsel’s submission first, this is consistent with the authorities. A 
survey of the cases prior to C v D reveals that courts never take into account the defendant’s 
knowledge in determining whether he was reckless; an assessment is undertaken purely on 
the basis of the likelihood of the defendant’s act causing the claimant’s harm.51 The strength 
of the authorities on this point is recognised by Arden LJ in her judgment.52 The irrelevance 
of the defendant’s knowledge in assessing recklessness is also consistent in principle. There 
are two possible ways of understanding what Buxton LJ labelled ‘subjective recklessness’. If 
by acting ‘with the knowledge that [the defendant’s acts] are likely to cause [harm]’ is meant 
that he merely takes the risk of the harm not happening – that is, that the result is ‘likely’ 
instead of ‘certain’ due merely to the inherent inevitability of consequences – then the harm 
is not merely a side effect of the defendant’s act, and the defendant therefore has an actual 
intention to bring the harm about.53 On the other hand, a defendant may choose a course of 
action, knowing full well and foreseeing that harm to the claimant would be a side effect of 
his act, but not actually intending such harm to be caused.54 Since in this case liability is not 
based on the defendant’s will but on the basis of the wrongful acceptance of the outcome of 
harm as an incident of his act,55 the focus ought rightly to be on the likelihood of such harm 
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being caused by the defendant’s act instead of on the defendant’s knowledge. It follows that 
the defendant should not be absolved from liability where the harm is (on an objective 
assessment) a likely consequence of his act but he acts without such knowledge.56 
 
However, a misanalysis occurs when Arden LJ gives ‘subjective recklessness’ the label 
‘recklessness’, and ‘objective recklessness’ the label ‘imputation’.57 Divorcing ‘imputation’ 
from ‘recklessness’ overlooks the crucial fact that ‘recklessness’ has always been concerned 
with an assessment of the likelihood of the defendant’s act causing the claimant’s harm – 
precisely what Buxton LJ called ‘objective recklessness’. It also leads to a deeper problem 
by suggesting, contrary to the authorities, that the likelihood of harm test is relevant only to 
‘subjective recklessness’ and that it is open to the courts to ‘impute’ intention on the basis of 
other factors.This was unfortunately the way in which Arden LJ proceeded to decide the 
case before the court. 
 
F. ‘Unjustifiability’ of the Conduct 
Since an intention can be imputed (whatever that may mean) apart from a consideration of 
the likelihood of harm criterion, the question arises: on what legal (as opposed to moral) 
basis is intention imputed? The answer given by the Court of Appeal was that to engage the 
rule in Wilkinson v Downton the defendant’s conduct must lack justification: 58  the 
‘unjustifiability’ of his acts (whatever it may be) would warrant the imputation of intention. 
Divorced from ‘likelihood of harm’, this ‘unjustifiability’ criterion was taken to be a 
freestanding requirement.59 
 
Arden LJ suggested that ‘there may be many ways in which the court could draw the line 
between acceptable … statements, and those which are actionable under this head’.60 She 
proceeded to suggest that liability might be restricted by demanding that the claimant should 
be a person of ‘ordinary phlegm’, although it would not be appropriate where the defendant 
knew of the claimant’s vulnerabilities; alternatively the tort might be restricted to acts which 
are ‘sufficiently outrageous’.61 She did not, however, commit to any particular method for 
determining the ‘unjustifiability’ of the defendant’s conduct. Instead, the only guidance given 
was that this should be judged ‘vis-à-vis the particular claimant’62 – a point which merely 
confirms the status quo that the rule in Wilkinson v Downton gives a cause of action ‘to the 
person to whom [false words or verbal threats] are uttered’.63 She continued: ‘The defendant 
may be perfectly entitled to dig holes in his garden in any location he chooses to dig them in 
but not … if they fall within the area he has already agreed to allow the claimant to walk 
across to take a short cut.’64 On the basis of the 2009 emails and Recital K, she found that 
MLA ‘has accepted a responsibility to use his best endeavours to ensure that OPO is 
protected from harmful information’; therefore ‘there is no justification for his words, if they 
are likely to produce psychiatric harm’.65 She also justified the imputation of intention on the 
basis that MLA’s book was ‘dedicated to OPO, and some parts of it are directed to him.’66 
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This reasoning is highly suspect. Earlier in the judgment, Arden LJ had dealt with OPO’s 
negligence claim and had held that, consistent with the binding authority of Barrett v Enfield 
LBC,67 parents do not owe a common law duty of care to their children. In rejecting this 
claim, Arden LJ considered whether the 2009 emails and Recital K would nevertheless 
impose a duty of care on MLA towards OPO, and came to the conclusion that ‘[t]hese 
documents contained no assumption of responsibility in law towards OPO. They were written 
to his mother.’68 Yet, curiously, Arden LJ found it possible to find MLA liable under the rule in 
Wilkinson v Downton based on the 2009 emails and Recital K without any further 
elaboration. This leads one to wonder whether there was really any legal, as opposed to 
moral, unjustifiability in MLA’s publishing of his book. 
 
Criticisms can also be levied against the other facts Arden LJ relied upon. Dedicating the 
book to OPO certainly does not mean that MLA ‘intend[ed] the Work to reach OPO’:69 highly 
technical legal textbooks which are dedicated to the authors’ young children and works 
which are dedicated to deceased individuals expose the absurdity of this conclusion. And in 
relation to the parts of the book which were allegedly directed to OPO, Arden LJ had earlier 
observed that MLA ‘has agreed to alter the Work to remove passages that might cause harm 
to OPO, removing for example a letter in it addressed to [OPO].’70 The case nevertheless 
came before the Court of Appeal because, despite MLA having made those changes, 
‘[OPO’s] mother does not consider that the changes to the Work have gone far enough.’71 
Since the book was not ‘directed’ or uttered72  to OPO, it is difficult to see why it was 
unjustifiable for MLA to publish his book. 
 
On a proper analysis, different weight would have been attached to the evidence, which may 
have resulted in an opposite outcome. The question that the Court of Appeal ought to have 
asked itself was as follows: is OPO likely to establish at trial that MLA’s proposed publication 
of the book would be likely to cause OPO physical injury so that MLA would be held to be 
reckless as to the causing of harm for the purposes of the rule in Wilkinson v Downton? It 
would have closely examined the possibility of OPO gaining access to MLA’s book. The fact 
that OPO was ‘computer savvy’73 would count in his favour. However, this ought to have 
been balanced against MLA’s efforts to prevent OPO from reading the book, thus reducing 
the likelihood of causing him harm. More weight would have been given to the fact that the 
book was to be directed only at an adult market, which, as Arden LJ observed, would 
‘normally mean that children would not obtain it’.74 MLA had, in fact, ‘been the subject of 
several television documentaries with substantial viewing figures’ which ‘had no impact on 
[OPO]’;75 and since MLA’s book was not to be distributed in Ruritania where OPO lived,76 
this would suggest that harm was unlikely to be caused.  
 
Similarly, the fact that MLA had removed passages directed to OPO which might cause him 
harm would have borne more weight.77 This is a particularly important point, since the Court 
of Appeal held that ‘OPO [was] unlikely to obtain the Work as such [although] OPO might 
well see extracts or quotations from it on the internet’.78 As for the 2009 emails and Recital 
K, these would have indicated that MLA had recognised the possibility of harm eventuating if 
OPO read the book; the documents would certainly not have made MLA liable simply 
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because he had ‘assumed responsibility’ for OPO. All things considered, it is doubtful 
whether the likelihood of harm criterion would have been satisfied. 
 
G. An Underlying Concern: ‘Justifiability’ 
The misanalysis inherent in the ‘unjustifiability’ criterion notwithstanding, a sympathetic view 
might be taken. Perhaps there was a wider underlying concern which, although not fully 
enunciated in any way by the Court of Appeal, may have played on the minds of the judges: 
viz the rule in Wilkinson v Downton does not allow judges to take into account the full range 
of potentially relevant policy considerations. It is important to consider whether there is any 
substance to this underlying concern. 
 
In cases such as OPO v MLA, the likelihood of harm criterion goes a long way to ensuring 
responsibility in the publication of an author’s (or filmmaker’s, or artiste’s) work via the media 
to the public. In particular, when dealing with works containing highly offensive elements, 
such authors etc. would escape being found reckless – it is unlikely that physical harm will 
be caused – only if they market their works through the correct channels or warn the public 
of its potentially offensive elements. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a wholly separate consideration of an author’s freedom of expression. 
It is true that in OPO v MLA the Court of Appeal was not dealing with the trial of the action, 
and thus made no findings of fact;79 it only had to determine whether OPO was ‘likely to 
establish that publication should not be allowed’ by virtue of section 12(3) of the Humans 
Rights Act 1998.80 In holding that section 12(3) was satisfied, Arden LJ pointed to ‘all the 
reasons given when discussing the claim under Wilkinson v Downton’, in particular the fact 
that ‘MLA accepted some measure of responsibility to protect OPO’ through Recital K and 
the 2009 emails. 81  However, throughout her earlier discussion of OPO’s Wilkinson v 
Downton claim, no effort whatsoever was made to take into account MLA’s freedom of 
expression and whether this would affect his liability under the tort. Yet, courts are bound to 
‘have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression’ 
by virtue of section 12(4) of the 1998 Act, and the rule in Wilkinson v Downton surely must 
be read in the light of this human right. In particular, it is regrettable that no attempt was 
made to analyse Recital K and the 2009 emails in a way that balanced OPO’s right to 
respect for his private and family life82 against MLA’s right to freedom of expression.83 This is 
all the more surprising given that Arden LJ did recognise the importance of such a balancing 
act early on in her judgment,84 but perceived its relevance to extend only to OPO’s claim 
under the tort of misuse of private information.85 
 
But perhaps the source of the problem lies with the existing structure of the rule in Wilkinson 
v Downton. Even if the Court of Appeal had properly analysed the case before it consistent 
with the existing authorities, there would still have been no analytical room for taking into 
consideration MLA’s freedom of expression, since assessing the likelihood of harm criterion 
involves considering merely the probability of harm being the causal effect of the defendant’s 
act, no more and no less.  
 
It is submitted that the best way forward would have been to develop a control mechanism 
based on the freestanding criterion of ‘justifiability’. Such a criterion would have been 
different from the ‘lack of justification’ approach taken by the Court of Appeal: it would not 
serve as a test to determine liability – this would be based on the defendant’s actual 
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intention or recklessness as measured by the likelihood of harm criterion – but as a test to 
determine whether liability ought properly to be precluded. The ‘justifiability’ criterion would 
also not have replaced, but would have been in addition to, the likelihood of harm criterion: it 
would have been a counterpart of the notion of ‘fair, just, and reasonable’ in the tort of 
negligence, an additional ‘control mechanism’86 by which policy considerations can be taken 
into account to preclude non-actionable damage. Furthermore, the ‘justifiability’ criterion 
would not have been applied in the arbitrary and haphazard manner in which the Court of 
Appeal dealt with the notion of ‘unjustifiability’, but in line with the human rights 
jurisprudence. It would have allowed courts to hold that, although a defendant may be 
reckless as to the causing of harm, he should nevertheless not be liable under the tort in 
view of his right to freedom of expression. 
 
In fact, such a mechanism goes further. Since any act by the defendant could potentially 
engage the rule in Wilkinson v Downton,87 the tort has a scope of application beyond acts 
involving the publication of information. Where the defendant’s freedom of expression is not 
a central concern, courts would still be able to preclude liability under the tort in line with any 
well-developed policy limitations which apply in relation to other torts .As Lord Rodger has 
observed in the context of the tort of negligence, ‘the world is full of harm for which the law 
furnishes no remedy.’88 So, for example, despite fulfilling the likelihood of harm criterion, a 
defendant’s liability might nevertheless be precluded in an appropriate case where his 
freedom of self-determination89 is at stake. To take another example, adapting one of Lord 
Rodger’s illustrations in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust,90 if a young man’s 
fiancée deserts him for his best friend, an act which may be likely to cause him psychiatric 
injury, ‘[e]xperience suggests that such intimate matters are best left to the individuals 
themselves’.91 Similarly, just as parents generally owe no duty of care towards their children 
for the purposes of the tort of negligence,92 so should liability under the rule in Wilkinson v 
Downton generally be precluded where a child brings a claim against his parent.93 
 
H. Conclusion 
The confusion brought about to the rule in Wilkinson v Downton by the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in OPO v MLA is regrettable. As a matter of precedent, the tort is engaged only 
where the defendant has an actual intention to cause physical injury, or is reckless as to the 
causing of such harm, the latter being determined by the likelihood of harm being caused by 
the defendant’s act. The idea of ‘imputed intention’ does not form a separate category of 
mental state for the purposes of the tort. In most cases, the likelihood of harm criterion 
appropriately draws the line between cases where the defendant’s act is justifiable and those 
where it is not. Other policy considerations which may justify precluding the application of the 
tort can be taken into account by developing a ‘justifiability’ criterion. This criterion ought to 
be developed in a principled manner, in line with the existing jurisprudence concerning 
human rights and with the policy limitations as developed in the context of other torts. 
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